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Can Educational Expansion Improve Income Inequality in China? 
Evidences from the CHNS 1997 and 2006 Data 
 
Rapid education expansion and rising income inequality are two striking phenomena 
occurring in China during the transitional period. Using the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) data collected in 1997 and 2006, this paper studies how education affects individual 
earnings during the transitional process. We find that education accounts for only a small 
fraction of personal earnings and income gap between different groups. We analyze the 
underlying mechanism of the impact of education on earnings. More educated people tend to 
enter state-owned sectors, have a low probability of changing jobs in the labor market and 
work less time; all of these will have a pronounced impact on earning and income inequality. 
Quantile regression analysis shows that the low-income group’s education return rate is 
lower, which helps little in narrowing income gap. We decompose the earning gap into four 
factors: population effect, price effect, labor choice effect and unobservable effect. In 
explaining the earning gap in China, the price effect is more important than the population 
effect. The labor choice effect is also significant. We conclude that increasing educational 
expenditure with no complementary measures such as reforming the education system and 
establishing a competitive labor market helps less in reducing income inequality. 
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1. Introduction   
Education  is  often  considered  to  exert  significant  impact  on  personal  income. 
Education  can  improve  an  individual’s  skills  and  signal  his  or  her  innate 
productivity; so that workers with a high education attainment often receive high 
earnings. Expanding education investment is therefore believed to be one of the key 
measures  to  reduce  poverty  and  income  inequality,  particularly  in  developing 
countries.  As  Ashenfelter  and  Rouse  (2000,  p.111)  point  out,  “The  school  is  a 
promising  place  to  increase  the  skills  and  incomes  of  individuals.  As  a  result, 
educational  policies  have  the  potential  to  decrease  existing,  and  growing, 
inequalities in income”. Heckman (2005) also declares that “human capital is the 
asset that ultimately determines the wealth of China. Fostering access to education 
will reduce inequality in the long run”.   
However,  during  the  transitional  process,  China  has  witnessed  contradictory 
phenomena.  On  the  one  hand,  we  observe  rapid  education  expansion  and  even 
partial over-education. Thanks to the 9-year compulsory education policy initiated 
in 1986， the enrollment rates of primary and secondary school rose
1  and the average 
education  attainment  is  quickly  increasing  too.  Furthermore,  the  education 
expansion starting since the late 1990s takes place more in high education and high 
schools. According to the Educational Statistics Yearbook of China 2007, in 1997, 
the number of students in colleges and universities, high schools, secondary schools 
and primary schools in every 100 thousands population were 519, 1978, 4408, and 
11,287,  respectively;  the  numbers  in  2007  were  1924,  3409,  4364,  and  8037, 
respectively. From the aspect of absolute quantity, the college enrollment and total 
number of students at high education schools in 1998 were 1.08 million and 3.41 
million, respectively, while in 2005 the numbers reached 5.05 million and 15.62 
million, with a growth rate of 368% and 358%, respectively.   
On  the  other  hand,  the  unemployment  rate  of  college  graduates  has  been  rising 
during  recent  years:  only  two  thirds  of  college  graduates  can  find  a  job  by 
                                                        
1  Particularly, the gross enrollment rate of secondary school rose considerably from 66.7% in 
1990 to 98% in 2007(Ministry of Education of China, 2008).       4 
graduation. Particularly, students from poor families have more difficulties in job 
hunting. At the same time, even though China economy has kept a high growth rate 
(9.8  percent  per  year  on  average)  for  30  years,  income  distribution  has  been 
deteriorating and the Gini coefficient for individual income has risen constantly to a 
relatively high level: from 0.382 in 1988 to 0.452 in 1995(Zhao et al., 1999), from 
0.29 in 1981 to 0.39 in 1995(World Bank, 1997), from 0.309 in 1981 to 0.447 in 
2001(Ravallion and Chen, 2004), from 0.37 in 1991 to 0.44 in 2000(Benjamin et al., 
2008).
2   
These seemingly contradictory facts lead us to ask two questions: Does education 
expansion contribute to the income inequality? What are the underlying mechanisms 
of education’s impact on individual income?
3   
Lai(1997) and Bai(2004) demonstrate there exists an inverted U-curve relationship 
between education expansion and income inequality in China; however, their 
conclusions were based on macro data and the micro influencing mechanisms are 
not fully explored. Based on the CHNS micro data collected in 1997 and 2006, this 
paper aims to explore how education affects personal earnings during the 
transitional process in China. We are interested in the following questions: To what 
extent does the educational structure and distribution change lead to income 
inequality? To what extent does the rate of return to education (the higher return to 
higher education level) play a role? Does education attainment change the behavior 
of labor supply choice? Do different groups’ rates of return to education vary?   
The  new  insights  of  this  paper  lie  in:  (1)  we  try  to  explore  the  underlying 
mechanisms  of  education’s  impact  on  income.  For  instance,  how  education 
attainment  leads  to  change  in  labor  supply  behavior.  Applying  the  quantile 
                                                        
2  Given  the  different  data  sources  and  different  measures,  researchers  can  get  different  Gini 
coefficient results. However, they share the consensus that income inequality shows a tendency of 
rising since the inception of reforms in 1978. Apart from the Gini coefficient, there are three other 
measures: the Theil index, the mean log deviation, the transformed cofficient of variation. The 
Gini coefficient measure is widely used and more appropriate. 
3  As wage income stands for a high proportion of residents’ total income in China, in this paper 
we focus on wage income inequality closely connecting with education. Khan et al.(1999) 
mentioned other components of income and improper dis-equalizing policies such as housing and 
social safety net.     5 
regression method, we try to test whether the low-income group’s education return 
rate is higher; consequently, whether schooling contributes to narrowing the income 
gap.  Using  the  decomposition  method  based  on  the  regression,  we  decompose 
changes in earning inequality into four factors: population effect (the distribution of 
education  among  population),  price  effect  (the  return  rate  to  different  education 
level), labor choice effect (differently educated labor group’s different worktimes 
and unit choices)  and unobservable  factors  (standing for  family background and 
personal unobservable characteristics). (2) We establish a relatively comprehensive 
earning determination model considering factors such as labor mobility and health 
human capital. We also use several alternative income indicators to conduct a return 
rate estimation, not only  of the annual wage income, but also of the total labor 
income per year; hourly earning is also used as a dependent variable to measure 
earning more precisely. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  some  brief  facts  about 
education expansion and income inequality in developed and developing economies. 
Data  source  and  empirical  methodology  are  introduced  in  section  3.  Section  4 
presents the results of the estimate and factor decompositions, with some further 
discussion. The last section concludes with policy implications.   
 
2.  Education  Expansion  and  Income  Inequality:  literature  review  and  some 
stylized facts   
There  exist  double-direction  links  between  education  attainment  and  income 
inequality. On the one hand, income inequality gives rise to education inequality. 
Even though education expands quickly in China, education attainment still varies 
across  different  groups  and  different  regions.  Inequality  of  accessibility  to  high 
school and high education increased over the period of 1989-2004(Saccone, 2008). 
In 2007, students graduating from college in Beijing amounted to 242,617, whereas 
in Qinghai, a province in western region, the number was only 15,483(Ministry of 
Education of China, 2008). Beijing’s number of graduate students is over 15 times   6 
higher than Qinghai’s.
4  Guo and Jia(2009) argue that the local public  education 
investment policy adopted in China is inefficient in promoting economic growth and 
narrowing wage differentials.   
The social stratification literature points to strong effects of social background on 
educational attainment in modern societies. Education inequality is prevalent and 
poor  families  did  not  benefit  much  from  education  expansion  and  education 
marketization  since  the  late  1990s  in  China  (Ding,  2006).  Education  choice  is 
endogenously determined. Children from poor families need to attend school more 
urgently to change their fates; however, there are economic barriers to continuing 
their  education.
5  Therefore,  income  inequality  leads  to  education  inequality  and 
education inequality further brings forth even serious income inequality in the future 
(Yang, et al., 2008).   
Other researchers argue that poor children (not the poorest) are not less educated, 
on the contrary, they might have been over-educated. Patrinos(1997) finds that in 
Greece the proportion of those overeducated that are from the lower classes is high 
(54 percent), although this varies by specialization. The reasons for over-education 
lie in that poor students have disadvantage in social capital network which is a 
crucial factor of obtaining good jobs in a relational society (Zhang, et al., 2009). In 
turn, they have to resort to a higher degree of education to signal their ability. As a 
result, over-educated persons are more likely to come from the lower classes and to 
migrate across the labor markets.   
Furthermore, the existing industry wage gap (which is related to income distribution 
in the labor market) also motivates students to crowd into the so-called populous 
                                                        
4  By contrast, according to China Statistical Yearbook 2008 (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2008), Beijing’s population at the end of 2007 is only about 3 times that of Qinghai’s 
(16.33 million and 5.52 million, respectively). 
5  Though education loans to some extent helped some poor students to continue their education, 
the application scope is still limited and credit constraint is obvious, the education burdens of poor 
families have not been considerably alleviated. Willen et al.(2004) show, however, that making 
education more affordable can increase income inequality. The mechanism that drives their results 
is a combination of credit constraints and the “signaling” role of education. Hence, this kind of 
income inequality is acceptable.   7 
majors of study such as finance, regardless of their innate talents and productivities. 
As  skilled  workers  could  not  obtain  good  payment,  technical  or  vocational 
education is backward and general-purpose high education is relatively redundant in 
China. Consequently, there is an over-supply of graduates in humanities and social 
science  and  a  shortage  of  technical  experts  on  the  labor  market.  Though 
working-age  workers  are  over-supplied,  skilled  workers  are  becoming  scarce  in 
recent years, which cannot meet the need of upgrading technology. In monopoly 
industries,  employees  are  well-paid  because  of  the  high  monopoly  rents.  Even 
though working in this industry does not necessarily require a high education level, 
firms  often  recruit  new  employees  by  setting  up  a  high  education  requirement 
entrance  threshold.  Biased  economic  development  strategy  also  leads  to  income 
gaps between occupations (Irizarry, 1980). There is good payment in special fields 
linked closely to foreign capital orientation policies in developing countries, such as 
foreign language, which also results in over-crowding in these fields. On the other 
hand, as they are depending heavily on developed countries’ technology, developing 
countries  do  not  demand  more  graduate  students  in  science  and  technology  and 
many educated labors are experiencing the process of deskilling.   
Conversely,  the  distribution  of  education  can  influence  income  distribution 
(Gregorio and Lee, 2002). Consequently, education inequality gives rise to income 
inequality.  According  to  the  World  Bank’s  statistics,  the  Gini  coefficient  of 
education  in  China  was  0.37  in  2000;  however,  the  Gini  coefficient  of  income 
reached 0.45 in 2001, suggesting that education inequality alone cannot explain the 
whole income inequality.   
Some attribute the rising income inequality in many countries to the increased return 
to high education level or convex return. Changes in the relative earnings among 
educational groups are always the leading force behind changes in inequality in 
Mexico (Legovini et al., 2005; Lopes-Acevedo, 2006).Ferreira et al.(2006) also find 
that the rising inequality in Brazil in the 1980s appears to have been driven by 
increases in the educational attainment of the population in a context of convex 
returns. In China the average return rate to schooling keeps rising and the return   8 
rates for different education categories have also been increasing, with much higher 
return rate for higher education levels (Lai, 1999; Li, 2003; Li and Ding, 2003; Li 
and Heckman, 2004). People having a lower education attainment benefit from 
absolute income increase; however, compared to those with a higher education level, 
the income gap is enlarged. Why do the highly educated obtain a much higher return? 
Does this relate to skill-biased technological change occurring in China or to other 
reasons, such as exploitation? If their higher wages cannot be fully compensated by 
their productivity, the income distribution becomes distorted.
6   
Even though poor students obtain the appropriate education, can they reap sufficient 
benefits of the investment in schooling? If not, then the income distribution pattern 
will not improve or even deteriorate. Education becomes more important in 
determining the choices of sectors and occupations in developing countries. Many 
students with a high degree try to seek a good job in the public sector; however, a 
high degree alone does not guarantee a government job if a student has no social 
capital network in relational society. Chen and Feng (2008) find that parents’ 
education affects children’s wage not only through human capital accumulation but 
also through the nepotism in the labor market. Public sector employees in Djibouti 
are more likely to be male and to come from the elite class with parents in the public 
sector (Casero and Seshan, 2006). In fact, job competition and over-education do 
not have beneficial influences on the disadvantaged; on the contrary, it discourages 
them from self-employment and the forming of entrepreneurship.   
Furthermore, income inequality also exists among people with the same education 
attainment (Hoxby and Terry, 1999; Lemieux, 2006). Is this related to a difference in 
ability?  Or  are  the  lucky  ones  that  have  a  good  job  selected  randomly?  Did 
Schooling change the ability distribution, or does it only play a signal role so that 
the income distribution will not improve? Using quantile regression, Martins and 
Pereira (2004) find a stylized fact over 16 developed countries: returns to schooling 
                                                        
6  On the other hand, it needs to be noted that the higher return to high education in China is also 
associated with self-selection problems, as only those who pass the rigid entrance exam (more 
capable) can enter college.   
   9 
increase over the wage distribution. To put it differently, the earnings increment 
associated  with  schooling  is  higher  for  those  individuals  whose  unobservable 
characteristics place them at the top of the conditional wage distribution. Heckman 
(2000) argues that it is non-cognitive skill that plays a role. We are interested in to 
what extent the income is determined by human capital obtained in school and to 
what extent by non-cognitive skills closely associated with the social background. 
Poor students perform the same or even better than others, but their labor market 
prospects are lower. 
Over-education  gives rise to further enlarged income inequality. People who are 
over-educated earn less. In a few studies the coefficient of over-education is found 
to  be  negative  and  statistically  significant  (Sicherman,  1991;  Patrinos,  1997; 
Borghans  and  Grip,  2000).  In  recent  years  it  became  more  difficult  for 
undergraduate and graduate students to find a good job in China. Some of them have 
to condescend to take a job in which their education quality cannot be fully applied, 
which inflicts their education returns. In this sense, the over-education choice is 
endogenously selected.     
All of the problems above are closely linked to the imperfect labor market. Partial 
over-education is taking place and educated labors congest in large eastern cities. 
Education expansion contributes less to the convergence of regional income. Cities 
in China are still not fully integrated so that they can be considered as local labor 
markets in which city-specific characteristics lead to differential returns to education, 
as Yang (2005) argues. Owing to the wage gap existing between regions, students 
from western areas will be reluctant to work in their hometown. In order to obtain a 
good job in the eastern area, they must further their education.   
Regarding the education’s signal function, it partly fails because of the irrational 
examination system and the enterprises’ limited or failed screening activities (Ning, 
2006). Therefore, pooling equilibrium arises, resulting in the skill heterogeneity of 
workers acquiring the same diploma. In order to stand out, highly skilled labor has 
to invest more in education. Why are firms not willing to screen? They care more 
about the cost and benefit of screening and the high costs discourage them.     10 
In the aspect of education quality, the lower education quality poor students 
experienced can only bring them lower returns to education. Education expansion 
leads to some problems. College enrollment expands sharply and education resource 
per capita is reduced, so that the quality of the graduates declines in recent years. 
Compared to college graduates 10 years ago, the skill decreasing in the recent 
cohort is evident. Unqualified graduates suffer from more income loss.   
Above all, we find out the complex relationship between education and income 
distribution, including the role of education structure, return rates to different 
education level, education’s signal and human capital improvement functions and 
quality of education. In this paper, we will explore and explain these problems by 
conducting some empirical analyses.   
 
3. Data Source and Methodology 
Our empirical analysis relies on data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) for the years 1997 and 2006, conducted by the Carolina Population Center 
at  the  University  of  North  Carolina  at  Chapel Hill  and  the  National  Institute  of 
Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Although the main aim of the survey is to investigate rural and urban residents’ 
health and nutrition conditions in China, other related information on education and 
income (previous year) is also reported, which is very useful for our study. CHNS 
data  covers  9  provinces:  Heilongjiang,  Jiangsu,  Shandong,  Guizhou,  Guangxi, 
Hubei,  Henan,  Hunan  and  Liaoning.
7  Richer  and  poorer  provinces  are  excluded 
from  the  sample  so  that  the  sampled  provinces  are  representative  of  a  typical 
province in China. The 1997 survey covers 16 cities with 128 neighborhoods and 32 
counties with 256 villages; the 2006 survey covers 18 cities with 216 neighborhoods 
and 36 counties with 432 villages. The sample sizes are 14,399 and 9788 adults (age 
18 and older) for 1997 and 2006, respectively. However, only 2875 in 1997 and 
2096 persons in 2006 held jobs and provided wage information.
8  Other information, 
                                                        
7  In 1997 survey, Liaoning is not included, only 8 provinces being covered.   
8  Only the people who hold jobs and earn wage enter our sample, so that the problems of selection   11 
such  as  age,  gender,  household  registration,  occupation  category,  and  types  of 
working unit, is also reported. We select these 2 years to make comparisons and test 
the impact of education expansion since the late 1990s on income distribution.   
Firstly, let us look at some statistics for the key variables: the average education 
attainment of the interviewed adults rises from 6.23 years in 1997 to 9.49 years in 
2006. As for individuals with jobs, the figure rises from 10.39 years in 1997 to 11.22 
years in 2006. Their average experience rises from 19.46 years in 1997 to 21.98 
years in 2006. The average annual labor income increases sharply, from 5996.71 
yuan in 1996 to 15,286.05 yuan in 2005,
9  with a wider dispersion in 2005(standard 
deviation expands from 5656 in 1996 to 27,964 in 2005).   
From a microeconomic point of view, changes in worker’s earnings can result from 
changes in decisions regarding labor force participation and working unit choice, in 
demographic  characteristics,  and  in  the  returns  to  those  characteristics.  The 
approach we use is designed to measure the relative importance of these different 
sources  of  income  change.  We  assume  that  earnings  are  a  function  of  skills 
measured  by  education  and  experience,  controlling  for  gender,  household 
registration (urban or rural residents), working unit characteristics and other related 
variables. We specify the econometric model as follows:   
e b b
b b b b b b b
+ + +
+ + + + + + + =
ess il unitscale
unit moblity hukou gender e e educ c wage
ln
exp exp ) log(
9 8




where  wagedenotes the individual wage earnings of the previous year (the year 
1996 and the year 2005),  educ  stands for years of schooling,  e exp   captures the 
work  experience  (subtracting  educ   plus  7  from  age ),  gender   is  the  gender 
dummy variable (1 for male and 0 for female),  hukou   is the dummy variable of 
household registration (1 for urban and 0 for rural),  mobility   is a dummy variable 
                                                                                                                                                               
bias might arise. We should therefore use some appropriate approaches to cope with these in our 
future research. 
9  Average real earning measured in 1996 yuan is 14,166.87.   12 
to represent labor mobility, it equals 1 if the individual changed job after 1993 or 
2004,  unit   captures the type of work unit. There are 8 types of units, including 
government  department,  state  service/institution,  state-owned  enterprises,  small 
collective enterprise (such as township-owned), large collective enterprise (such as 
owned  by  county,  city,  province),  family  contract  farming,  private,  individual 
enterprise and three-capital enterprise (owned by foreigners, overseas Chinese and 
joint venture). We define the first three types as 1 and the other 5 types as 0 in order 
to find out if working in the state-owned sector has significant positive impact on 
earning.  unitscaleis the dummy variable for size of work unit, it equals 1 if the 
number  of  employees  in  the  work  unit  is  more  than  100  and  0  otherwise.  The 
coefficient of this variable can tell us whether the scale of work unit (or monopoly 
status)  contributes  to  high  earning.  ess illn is  the  health  human  capital  indicator 
reached by asking whether during the past 3 months the respondents have had any 
difficulty carrying out their daily activities and work or studies due to illness, the 
answer yes is signed as 1, no is 0.  e   is an error term.
10   
The dependent variables also include annual earnings (income, monthly wage and 
subsidies multiplied by working month,
11  then plus yearly bonus), hourly earnings 
( worktime income/ , total annual earning divided by working hours per year). For 
the  education  indicator,  we  will  also  evaluate  returns  to  different  educational 
categories  through  dummy  variables  such  as  secondary  school,  high  school, 
technical  or  vocational  degree,  university  or  college  degree  and  higher(using 
primary school education level as reference group). For unit categories, likewise, we 
have several dummy variables to calculate the return to individual unit type.   
Considering the possibility that a high educated person is more likely to enter the 
                                                        
10  The omission of an individual’s ability in the OLS regression may result in a biased and 
inconsistent estimate of the returns coefficient due to positive correlation between schooling and 
ability. Three strategies are used to deal with this ability bias, namely the instrumental variable 
approach, the fixed effect method, and direct measurement of ability. However, each of these 
approaches has stringent data requirements (see Yang, 2005). CHNS does not have sufficiently 
enough data to permit careful corrections for the ability bias.   
11  In other case, 12 is multiplied by assuming wage and subsidies are automatically obtained 
every month without being influenced by worktime.     13 
state unit, we replace the education category variables with occupation type 
variables. There are 12 occupation categories: senior professional/technical worker 
(doctor, professor, lawyer, architect, engineer); junior professional/technical worker 
(midwife, nurse, teacher, editor, photographer); administration/executive/manager 
(working proprietor, government official, section chief, department or bureau 
director, administrative cadre, village leader); office staff(secretary, office helper); 
farmer, fisherman, hunter; skilled worker(foreman, group leader, craftsman); 
non-skilled worker(ordinary laborer, logger); army officer, police officer; ordinary 
soldier, policeman; driver; service worker(housekeeper, cook, waiter, doorkeeper, 
hairdresser, counter salesperson, launderer, child care worker); athlete, actor, 
musician.   
Eq. (1) is a commonly used but highly restrictive human capital model, as it 
assumes that the returns to education and experience are the same for all workers. If 
the schooling-related earnings increment were not the same across the income 
distribution, then schooling would impact upon within-levels income inequality, as 
income distributions conditional on different levels of schooling would differ not 
only in their locations, but in their dispersions as well. In this case, an OLS 
regression is not informative and quantile regression model should be applied. We 
will use quantile regression in section 4 to test if education’s return rates across the 
income distribution are different, which is crucial for studying education’s role in 
reducing income inequality. 
We also test the role of different factors (labor force participation and working unit 
choice,  demographic  characteristics,  and  the  returns  to  those  characteristics)  in 
income  differential.  A  decomposition  method  is  applied  here.  The  income  it y of 
individual  iobserved at time  tis assumed to depend on four sets of variables: the 
observable  personal  characteristics x ,  unobservable  characteristicse ,  the  set  of 
prices and labor-remuneration ratesb , and a set of parameters defining the labor 
force participation and working timel : ) , , , ( it it it it it x Y y l b e = . 
Like  the  well-known  Oaxaca-Blinder  methodology,  the  difference  between  two   14 
group’s income can then be decomposed into price effect (the effect of changes in 
the returns to education and experience), population effect (the effect of changes in 
the distribution of education, experience, and etc), labor choice effect (the effect of 
changes in the working time and unit choice) and unobservable factor effect (the 
effect of changes in the distribution of the errors in the earnings equations). The 
decomposition can then be stated as   
)] , , , ( ) , , , ( [ )] , , , ( ) , , , ( [
)] , , , ( ) , , , ( [ )] , , , ( ) , , , ( [
i i i i j i i i j i i i j j i i
j j i i j j j i j j j i j j j j
x y x y x y x y
x y x y x y x y y
e l b e l b e l b e l b
e l b e l b e l b e l b
- + - +
- + - = D
  (2) 
The four parts in this equation represent an exact “sequential” decomposition of 
price effect, population effect, labor-choice effect, and unobservable factor effects.       
 
4. Econometric results and discussion   
4.1 The impact of education on income 
 
Table1 Determinants of various types of income 
 
Firstly，we examine the impact of education attainment on earnings. As shown in 
Table 1, applying the Mincer function in 2006 data, we obtain different return rates 
to years of schooling where different income types are used as dependent variables. 
When wage is used as the dependent variable in column (1), the rate of return to 
education is 7.9%. When annual earning is used as dependent variable in column (3), 
the return rate rises to 11.3%. In the case of hourly earning in column (5), the return 
rate is the highest, 12.5%.
12  This implies that more educated workers have more 
advantage in bonus distribution than in wage distribution. Furthermore, less 
educated workers have to work more time to make a living. When we control for 
other individual characteristics such as gender, hukou, unit type and mobility in 
column (2), (4) and (6), the absolute values of education return rate become lower 
(which implies that ignoring the controlling variables will overestimate the 
                                                        
12  As Li (2003) states, previous works using annual earnings instead of hourly wages bias the 
return rate estimates downward.     15 
education return rate), but the relative scale and rank do not change. As shown in the 
last two columns of Table 1, the return rate to education in 1996 is only between 3.6 
and 3.7%. Our results are comparable to previous studies using other data sources. 
For example, using 1988 and 1995 data from a national household survey, Yang 
(2005) finds that the estimated rates of return at the city level increased from 3.1 to 
5.1% between those 2 years. Based on the survey conducted by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science (CASS), Luo’s study (2007) shows that return rate to 
education was 6.76% in 2002. On average, compared to the 1990s and early in 
2000s, the return rate to education increased as the transitional process deepened in 
China, which will exert an impact on income inequality. In addition, the earnings 
increase as the experience grows, with a diminishing return rate, which conforms to 
the traditional human capital theory. The return rate to experience also remained 
relatively stable over the 9-year period.   
There are some other noticeable findings in the income regression functions in Table 
1. In 2005, a male worker earned about a range of 23.8-26.0% more than a female 
one. A worker with urban household registration earned about 7.5-11.5% more than 
a worker coming from a rural area. This might suggest that gender discrimination 
and social status discrimination exist in the labor market. Regarding labor mobility, 
contrary to human capital theory and other empirical studies, people who changed 
their job suffer from income loss rather than enjoy income gain.
13  This may be 
because most of those who changed jobs were involuntary unemployed during the 
period  of  economic  recession  or  state-owned  enterprise  restructuring  reform.  It 
might also be due to the fact that labor mobility is very low and changing jobs is a 
negative signal to the employers in China. As expected, working in state unit and 
unit employing a large number of workers brought a worker more pay-off in 2005, 
indicating that unit monopoly has a positive impact on earning. However, in 1996, 
working  in  a  state  enterprise  or  institute  could  not  ensure  wage  premium,  even 
inflicting some loss, despite this not being statistically significant. This is attributed 
                                                        
13  In 1996, there was some income premium from job change, but this was not statistically 
significant.       16 
to the state-owned enterprises’ adverse conditions during the reforming process in 
the 1990s. It can also be seen that people who had any difficulty carrying out work 
during the past 3 months due to illness suffered a wage loss, but the impacts are not 
statistically  significant  in  total  income  and  hourly  earning  models.
14  The  health 
human capital theory is only partially supported.   
So far we still do not know the exact ways in which education influence the income. 
According  to  the  classical  human  capital  theory,  more  educated  workers  have  a 
higher labor-force participation rate and works longer time, more prone to move in 
labor  markets  to  seek  for  better  jobs,  more  likely  to  enter  the  state-owned  or 
monopoly sector to earn high wages, having a higher probability of escaping from 
illness and maintaining a stable income level. Do all these hold true in China?     
 
Table 2    How does education affect income: the underlying mechanisms(2005)         
 
As shown in column (1) of Table 2, the more educated workers work less time, 
possibly because they have an inflexible time schedule or the higher wage rates 
enable them to enjoy more leisure time. Using wage rate (income hourly) as 
explanatory variable (other variables are unit scale and gender), we find that the 
coefficient of wage rate is negative;
15  in other words, the income effect dominates 
the substitution effect. Moreover, workers in the state-owned sector work less time; 
however, those in large-scale units work more time. People holding urban 
household registrations work less time. A logit model is estimated in column (2) and 
shows that the more educated are more likely to enter state-owned sector. Urban 
household registration holders and male workers are also more likely to join in the 
state-owned sector. Column (3) shows that the more educated are less likely to 
                                                        
14  Because of its insignificance, we omit the health variable in the total income and hourly earning 
models in Table 1.     
15
unitscale gender worktime income worktime
* * * * * * * * * * * 037 . 0 060 . 0 ) / log( 141 . 0 783 . 7 ) log( + + - =
; adjusted R
2=0.066, observations=1823.   17 
move in the labor market, which contradicts classical human capital theory. There 
still exist some barriers to migration in the labor market restricting the more 
educated to move. It is those who are less educated that move frequently in the 
secondary labor market in China. In column (4), it seems that the more educated are 
less likely to suffer from work loss due to illness, but the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. In summary, Table 2 illustrates that the mechanisms of 
worktime and sector selection are sufficiently confirmed, while the mobility and 
health mechanisms are insignificant.   
 
Table3 Education category, unit and occupational choice and income   
 
In order to investigate the role of education role in income determination more 
precisely, we estimate the return to different education categories. Column (1) of 
Table 3 shows that in 2005, compared to the return to primary school, the return to 
secondary school, high school, technical or vocational degree, and college or 
university degree and above are 16.3%, 31.6%, 48.1%, and 76.9% higher, 
respectively. Whereas column (4) shows that in 1996, compared to the return to 
primary school, the return to secondary school, high school, technical or vocational 
degree, and college or university degree and above are 3.2% lower (though the 
effect is not significant), 8.1% higher, 2.3% higher (not significant), and 12.1% 
higher, respectively. The return gap between primary school and college or 
university degree was enlarged substantially in recent years, which leads to an 
obvious income inequality
16. Are the different return rates rational? One may 
attribute this to the increased demand for technology-biased skill and relative 
limited supply of educated labor in China. However, we should still be cautious 
about the overpayment for the highly educated owing to the imperfectly competitive 
labor market. This implies that obtaining just a primary or secondary education 
                                                        
16  By contrast, through international empirical study, Trostel(2004) indicates
 that human capital 
production displays significant increasing
 returns at low levels of educational attainment, and 
significant
 decreasing returns at high levels of educational attainment.   18 
helps less in the case of rising education return rate. It can also be found in 
column(1) that in 2005, compared to working in the government department, those 
working in state service/institutions, small collective enterprises, large collective 
enterprises, family contract farming, and private and individual enterprises earn 
11.8% higher, 18.3% less, 28.1% less, 49.5% less, 13.2% less, respectively. Overall, 
workers in the state-owned sector have a high wage premium. In addition, working 
more time will significantly increase the yearly income.
17   
Since education level and unit type might be correlated (more educated persons are 
more likely to enter the state-owned sector), column (2) replaces the education 
variables with occupation variables to avoid the multicollinearity problem. 
Compared to senior professional/technical workers, the payment of other 
occupations is less, especially that of non-skilled occupations and service 
occupations having low education requirement. However, the problem of 
multicollinearity is not serious by observing the correlation matrix. Therefore, the 
model in column (3) has a full set of variables. Controlling for occupational 
variables, the return gap between different education categories still exists but 
narrows. The return rate to education reduces at every education level, implying the 
weakened role of education in reducing poverty. Unit and occupation choice are 
also important for income gain. 
 
Table 4 Different factors’ contribution to income (%, 2005) 
 
Based  on  the  regression  function  of  full  sample,  we  test  the  effects  of  different 
factors on income. The calculation method is the mean value of explanatory variable 
multiplied by the return rate, then divided by the mean value of logarithm of income. 
Column  (1)  of  Table  4  presents  the  results  using  working  months  to  calculate 
income. We also use 12 months to calculate annual income, considering wage or 
other income is automatically received regardless of working time. The results are 
                                                        
17  As people lay more emphasis on total income in developing countries, we use income per year 
as the dependent variables in the following analysis.     19 
listed  in  column  (2).  In  both  cases,  the  variable  of  education  accounts  only  for 
approximately  9.6-10.9%  of  income.  Personal  characteristics  and  unit  type  also 
explain a small proportion. Worktime is an important factor. The residual in the 
regression  function  represents  rewards  for  unobservable  ability  and  family 
background, which is also a great share of income. 
4.2 Education and income distribution: quantile regression results   
The income gap is large even for people with the same education level. This 
probably weakens the education’s role in reducing income inequality. Taking the 
individuals with college and university degrees as an example, their average annual 
income in 2005 is 21,030.54 yuan, the maximum reaching 216,000 yuan and the 
minimum only 1200 yuan. The standard deviation is 19,209.77. The income 
equation estimation result is listed as below， with an adjusted R
2 of 0.23 and sample 
size of 404.   
ess il mobility worktime unitscale unit
e e hukou gender income
ln 191 . 0 028 . 0 ) log( 676 . 0 124 . 0 214 . 0
exp 00015 . 0 exp 015 . 0 223 . 0 139 . 0 983 . 3 ) log(
* * * * * * * *
2 * * * *
- - + + +
- + + + =
(3) 
As shown in the equation (3), personal characteristics like gender and hukou 
influence income; unit and unit scale also play a great role. Having a high degree is 
not sufficient to guarantee a high income. Only entering a monopoly sector through 
social network can ensure a high and stable income.   
To test the profound relationship between education attainment and income 
inequality, we estimate a quantile regression model to analyze the return rate at 
different income distribution points. The dependent variable is yearly income. The 
independent variables include education year, years of experience, square of years 
of experience, unit, unit scale, gender, mobility dummy, household registration, 
illness, and worktime. The sample size is 1726. The estimation results are shown in 
Fig.1. It can be found that the education year’s coefficients display a tendency of 
slightly downward sloping as the quantile point moves up, but turn upward at the 
fifth and ninth quantile points, suggesting a complex relationship between education 
attainment and income inequality. In some high-income distribution points, the   20 
return rates are relatively high, implying that education expansion has the impact of 
enlarging the income gap. Applying the CHNS data of 2004 (the sample size is 
1931), Liu(2008) conducts a quantile regression and finds that the return rates at 0.1, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9 point are 7.22%, 6.8%, 6.74%, 5.58%, and 5.24%, 
respectively, suggesting that the return rate has a tendency of decreasing with the 
income. Our results are different from Liu’s, as we use 2006 data and more 
explanatory variables are included.   
 
Fig.1. The return rate to education at different quantile point (education year, 2005)   
 
We also estimate returns to different educational categories at different quantile 
points, using primary school education level as reference group. The explanatory 
variables of education are dummy variable of secondary school, high school, 
technical or vocational degree, and college or university degree and higher. Other 
independent variables include years of experience, square of years of experience, 
unit, unit scale, gender, mobility dummy, household registration, illness, and work 
time. The sample size is 1726. Fig.2 plots the results; the insignificant coefficients 
are not shown in the figure.       
 
Fig. 2. Education’s return at different quantile point (education category, 2005)   
 
It can be seen in Fig. 2 that the returns to secondary school are insignificant at 0.1, 
0.2, and 0.9 quantile points, suggesting that for certain group (to become the 
low-income group
18), obtaining only a secondary school diploma helps less in 
improving their income status. This implication is also in accordance with the basic 
observation that some low-income families often complain that the compulsory 
                                                        
18  Martins and Pereira (2004) attribute the lower wage distribution (lower quantile point) to the 
workers’ lower skill and explore the reasons from the aspect of over-education, ability and school 
quality. As mentioned in section 2, all these reasons exist in China. However, most importantly in 
China, the imperfect labor market restricts competition and prevents the similarly capable labors’ 
education return rate from equalizing.           21 
secondary schooling played little role in improving their income and reducing 
poverty. For high school, the return rate is insignificant at 0.1 point, then becomes 
rising, showing that obtaining a high school degree is more beneficial for the 
middle- and high-income group, which will also enlarge the income gap. The 
technical or vocational degree’s returns are higher at low and middle quantile points, 
as through the technical or vocational education students can learn some practical 
skills closely related to their future career. For the low-income group, obtaining 
such education contributes to their income gain, but the return difference is small.
19 
College or university degree’s return rates also show the tendency of downward 
sloping, which helps improve income distribution, but at 0.9 point it starts rising 
again.   
Overall, roughly speaking, for the low-income group, obtaining a secondary or high 
school degree helps less in improving their income condition, while obtaining 
technical or university degree can reduce the income inequality. 
4.3 Decomposition of income gap 
 
Table 5 Mean value and coefficient of variable (full sample and low-income group, 
2005)     
 
To provide corroborating evidence, we decompose different group’s earning gap 
into four factors: population effect, price effect, labor choice effect, and 
unobservable effect. As for the role of education, we want to examine the income 
impact of education distribution among population, return rate to education, 
different group’s participation rate and working unit choice, and personal capability 
or family background, respectively. Table 5 explains the income gap between the 
full sample and the low-income group
20  and the influencing factors. Insignificant 
results are not reported. We list the explanatory variables’ mean value and 
                                                        
19  In the case of Taiwan, obtaining a higher secondary education (vocational) can also earn a 
higher income than that of ordinary secondary education. See Bourguignon, et al.(2005).       
20  We divide the full sample into three sub-samples according to worker’s earning level.   22 
coefficients. The income gap between full sample and low-income group is the 
difference of their mean values of logarithm of incomes, which are attributed to 
various factors. Taking education year as an example, low-income group’s 
education attainment is lower (9.75<11.21, population effect), and its return rate is 
lower (0.029<0.091, price effect). Hence, educational structure difference can 
explain only 16.6% ((11.21-9.75)*0.091
21/(9.36-8.56)) of the income gap, while the 
price effect, the difference of return to education, accounts for 75.6% 
(9.75*(0.091-0.029)
22/(9.36-8.56)) of the income gap. This also reflects the fact that 
only improving the poor’s education attainment without changing the income 
distribution in labor markets is not sufficient. Concerning the role of gender, the 
low-income group is composed of more female workers, and male workers cannot 
earn much more than their counterparts in the full sample. It is also true that the 
price effect exceeds the population effect (8.46%>3.9%). Worktime difference 
accounts for the greatest proportion of the income gap, not only because people 
from the low-income group work for less time, but also because the return to 
worktime is lower, which is much more important for the income gap 
(114.85%>8.39%). Using the CHNS 1989-2000 data, Chen and Wang (2006) 
decompose the wage functions into quantity effect (similar to the population effect 
here), price effect and unobservable effect and find that much of the rise in income 
gap between low-income and high-income group can be attributed to the price 
effect.
23  Considering the labor choice effect, precedent analysis in this paper 
suggests that more educated people choose to work less time in China, thus 
narrowing the income gap. Meanwhile, Table 5 shows that labor choice connecting 
with worktime works in an opposite direction, enlarging the income gap. Unit scale 
                                                        
21  Here we only consider the income gap resulting from the low-income group’s lower education 
year, holding its education return rate same as the full sample’s.   
22  Here we consider the income gap resulting from the difference of return rates, assuming 
obtaining the education year of low-income group. 
23  Similarly, Lemieux (2006) points out that most of the increase in wage inequality between 1973 
and 2005 in the U. S. is due to dramatic increases in the return to postsecondary education. 
Changes in wage inequality are increasingly concentrated at the very top end of the wage 
distribution.   23 
has a small impact of equalizing income between the groups, contrary to the 
classical labor choice effect prediction.
24The unobservable effect also takes a high 
proportion (23.75%, (0.59-0.40)/(9.36-8.56)), implying that unobservable ability 
and family background exert a great effect on income distribution.   
 
5. Summary   
Using  the  CHNS  data  collected  in  1997  and  2006,  this  paper  explores  how 
education affected personal income during the transitional process in China. We find 
that education explains only a small fraction of personal income and income gap 
across different income groups. However, more educated people tend to work in the 
state-owned sector, have a low probability of moving in the labor market and work 
less  time,  which  have  a  pronounced  impact  on  income  inequality.  Quantile 
regression results indicate that the low-income group’s education return rate is lower, 
particularly  at  the  secondary  school  and  high  school  level,  which  helps  little  in 
narrowing the income gap. We decompose changes in the earning  gap into four 
factors: population effect (the distribution of education among population), price 
effect  (the  return  to  different  education  level),  labor  choice  effect  (differently 
educated labor group’s different participation rates and working unit choices) and 
unobservable  effect  (personal  ability  and  family  background).  In  explaining  the 
income  gap  in  China,  price  effect  and  labor  choice  effect  are  large  relative  to 
population effect.   
Our study can shed light on education development in other transitional developing 
countries. The policy implication is that increasing education expenditure with no 
complementary measures such as reforming the education system and establishing a 
competitive labor market helps little in reducing income inequality. In the aspect of 
education reform, government should make access to education easier and reduce 
education inequality,
25improve schooling quality and reduce partial over-education, 
                                                        
24  Here, the impacts of worktime and unit choice (including price effect and population effect) are 
called labor choice effect.   
25  Ram (1990) found that educational inequality first increases, and, after reaching a peak, starts 
declining in later phases of educational expansion. However, we should take some active measures   24 
and establish a social network between employer and school to help the employer 
screen  capable  employees(Rosenbaum  and  Blinder,  1997).  More  importantly, 
constructing  a  competitive  labor  market,  encouraging  workers  to  flow  freely, 
adjusting  different  workers’  education  return  rate  to  their  true  productivity,  and 
adjusting  wages  among  industries  or  sectors  through  marketization(workers  with 
similar human capital should earn similar wages, even though working in different 
industries or sectors
26) are identified as important measures to narrow the income 
gap.       
There are some limitations in our paper. The sample includes only 9 provinces, so 
we should be cautious about generalizing our conclusion to the whole country.
27 
Expanding the sample size, enlarging the time scope of analysis and decomposing 
the Gini coefficient differential of different  years are the agendas of our further 
work.   
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Table1 Determinants of various types of income 
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  -0.048 
(-1.477) 
illness    -0.119
* 
(-1.703) 
           
sample 
size 




0.114  0.158  0.163  0.223  0.208  0.275  0.059  0.076 
Note: t-statistic values are in parentheses. 
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 * represent that the coefficient is significant at 
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Table 2 How does education affect income: the underlying mechanisms (2005)         




sector=1 ) (2) 
mobility (logit, 
change job=1)   
(3) 
illness (logit, 
work loss due to 
illness=1 )(4) 
constant  2489.64
***(37.33)       
educ  -22.35
*** (-3.45)  1.360
*** [14.18]  0.926
*** [-2.99]  0.989[-0.24] 
unit  -230.66
*** (-6.36)       
unitscale  57.37
* (1.75)       
hukou  -81.43
** (-2.08)  4.997
*** [11.88]     
gender    1.413
*** [3.19]     
Sample size  1744  1984  2001  2000 
Adjusted R
2  0.063       
Pseudo R
2    0.21  0.01  0.0001 
Note: The numbers in the parentheses are the t-statistic value, in brackets are z-statistic value. The 
coefficients in logit model are odds ratio coefficients. 
***,
 ** and
 * represent that the coefficient is 
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Table3 Education category, unit and occupational choice and income   











*** (12.989)  4.871
*** (16.199)  4.336
*** (14.323)  5.063
*** (12.265)  5.113
*** (12.421) 
secon  0.163
*** (2.959)    0.096
* (1.748)  -0.032 (-0.715)  -0.055 (-1.216) 
high  0.316
*** (5.116)    0.203
*** (3.236)  0.081
* (1.647)  0.038 (0.771) 
occup  0.481
*** (7.293)    0.287
*** (4.189)  0.023 (0.381)  0.022 (0.370) 
univ  0.769
*** (11.413)    0.513
*** (7.113)  0.121
** (1.997)  0.124
** (2.001) 
expe  0.029
*** (6.092)  0.016
*** (3.565)  0.024
*** (5.151)  0.022




*** (-4.947)  -0.00039
*** (-3.987)  -0.00044
*** (-4.419)  -0.00032
** (-2.283)  -0.00030
** (-2.173) 
gender  0.270
*** (9.068)  0.232
*** (7.491)  0.219
*** (7.225)    0.155
*** (4.565) 
hukou  0.102
*** (2.767)  0.184
*** (5.072)  0.112
*** (3.026)     
mobility  -0.130
*** (-2.680)  -0.139
*** (-2.827)  -0.130
*** (-2.692)     
unitscale  0.118
*** (3.757)  0.148
*** (4.610)  0.132





*** (15.917)  0.587
*** (15.362)  0.596
*** (15.924)  0.424
*** (7.789)  0.402
*** (7.403) 
illness  -0.087(-1.138)  -0.061(-0.801)  -0.071(-0.950)     
Unit          -0.049 (-1.370) 
Unit1  0.118
** (2.055)  0.142
** (2.157)  0.138
** (2.131)     
Unit 2  -0.051(-0.779)  0.075(1.052)  0.084(1.206)     
Unit 3  -0.183
** (-2.480)  -0.141
* (-1.827)  -0.075(-0.993)     
Unit4  -0.281
*** (-3.179)  -0.180
* (-1.929)  -0.141(-1.537)     
Unit5  -0.495
* (-1.682)  -0.916
** (-2.515)  -0.943
***(-2.644)     
Unit6  -0.132
** (-2.188)  0.008 (0.113)  0.057(0.841)     
Unit7  0.115(1.170)  0.263
** (2.469)  0.276
*** (2.641)     
Occup1    -0.235
*** (-3.854)  -0.206
*** (-3.438)     
Occup2    -0.138
** (-2.088)  -0.090(-1.376)     
Occup3    -0.263
*** (-4.526)  -0.189
*** (-3.275)     
Occup4    0.229(0.768)  0.473(1.610)     
Occup5    -0.489
*** (-7.601)  -0.299
*** (-4.456)     
Occup6    -0.739
*** (-12.040)  -0.524
*** (-7.951)     
Occup7    0.025(0.110)  0.036(0.161)     
Occup8    -0.401
** (-2.152)  -0.240(-1.307)     
Occup9    -0.479
*** (-5.628)  -0.281
*** (-3.219)     
Occup10    -0.794
*** (-12.390)  -0.609
*** (-9.111)     
Occup11    -0.560
*** (-2.718)  -0.395
* (-1.951)       34 
Sample size    1682  1641  1641  1067  1031 
Adjusted R
2 
0.356  0.375  0.401  0.091  0.124 
Note: t-statistic values are in parentheses. 
***,
 ** and
 * represent that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels，respectively. Unit 1 to Unit 7 are dummy variables, government department is used for comparison. 
Unit 1 is state service/institution; Unit 2 is state-owned enterprises; Unit 3 is small collective enterprise; Unit 4 is 
large collective enterprise; Unit 5 is family contract farming; Unit 6 is private, individual enterprise; Unit 7 is 
three-capital enterprise. The same is for occupations, senior professional/technical worker used for comparison. 
Occup 1 is junior professional/technical worker; Occup 2 is administration/executive/manager; Occup 3 is office 
staff; Occup 4 is farmer, fisherman and hunter; Occup 5 is skilled worker; Occup 6 is non-skilled worker; Occup 7 
is army officer and police officer; Occup 8 is ordinary soldier and policeman; Occup 9 is driver; Occup 10 is 
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Table 4 Different factors’ contribution to income (%, 2005) 
  Income (working months) (1)  Income (12 months) (2) 
educ  10.9%  9.6% 
expe  2.82%  2.31% 
gender  1.56%  1.49% 
hukou  0.77%  0.46% 
mobility  -0.14%    -0.064% 
unit  1.08%  0.71% 
unitscale  0.35%  0.34% 
worktime  49.4%  14.45% 
constant  33.26%  70.70% 
unobservable factors  6.4%  6.1% 
Sample size    1738  1738 
Adjusted R
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Table 5 Mean value and coefficient of the variable (full sample and low-income group, 
2005)     
  Full sample    Low-income    group 
  Mean    Coefficient 
(significant)   
Mean    Coefficient 
(significant) 
educ  11.21  0.091  9.75  0.029 
expe  22.02  0.021  22.67   
expe
2  601.83  -0.00033  658.25   
gender  0.61  0.24  0.48  0.099 
hukou  0.72  0.1  0.58   
mobility  0.1  -0.13  0.17   
unit  0.48  0.21  0.23   
unitscale  0.36  0.09  0.30  0.125 
worktime  7.58  0.61  7.47  0.487 
constant    3.09    4.50 
Unobservable 
factors   
0.59    0.40   
Log(income)  9.36    8.56   
Sample size      1726    521 
Adjusted R
2    0.332    0.336 
 
 